This paper is concerned with two-person non-zero-sum game versions of the secretary problem. A remarkable feature of our models compared with previous ones is that Nash equilibrium strategies are different for two players, i.e. one player should behave more hastily, and the other less hastily, than in the secretary problem.
Introduction
This paper will be concerned with two-person non-zero-sum game versions of the so-called secretary problem. For the original secretary problem, the reader is referred to, e.g., Gilbert & Mosteller [1] . Our basic model (ModeZ A) is as follows.
There are two companies each of which is faced with the problem of employing a secretary from one and the same set of n girls. If the companies could interview all the girls, they could rank the applicants absolutely with no ties, from best (rank 1) to worst (rank n), ranking being identical for both companies. However, the applicants present themselves one by one, in random order, and when the t-th applicant appears, the companies can observe only her rank relative to her (t-l) predecessors. We further assume that the recall is not permitted, i.e., each company must decide either to accept or to reject the t-th applicant to appear based upon her and the predecessors' relative ranks, without delay after the interview. equal probabilities and the process stops,.
The objective of each company is to maximize the probability of employing the best of n girls.
Game-theoretic versions of the secretary problem have been discussed by Presman & Sonin [3] , Kurano et al. [2] , and Sakaguchi [4] . A remarkable feature of our model compared with previous ones is as follows. The opt~ma1 strategy for the original secretary problem has a threshold character, i.e., there exists an integer s(n) such that one must stop at the appearance of the first candidate (the object which is better than all the predecessors) after (s(n)-l)th, and shch a strategy is called s(n)-threshold strategy. In all of the previous models, Nash equilibrium solutions are such that players use the same threshold which are smaller than that for the original secretary problem (without a competitor). On the other hand, equilibrium strategies in our model are different for two players, i.e. one player should behave more hastily, and the other less hastily, than in the origlna1secretary problem. This fact 'Hill be shown in the next section. We will also discuss about slightly different versions of our model in section 3.
Equilibrium Solutions
Suppose that ·companies tf1 and 1f2 employ x-and y-thresRold strategies respectively, and that,the probabilities that each company succeeds in employing the best of ngir1s'be denoted by Ml(X,y) ,and M2(X,y). Then it is easy to 
1.
1.
Similarly as in t~e original secretary problem and the related works, we are interested in the limiting form of the optimal s'trategy as n tends to infinity.
Thus we let n + 00, and we will use the symbols x, y;. t and Ml(X,y) , throughout " y/n;, the rest of this section, for the limiting values of x/n, t/n and Ml (x,y) respectively in (2.1), since this convention will not make, any confusion. Then we have, in the limit" Remember that the optimal strategy for the limiting version of the secretary problem is the lIe-threshold strategy. Fig. 1 shows that the player in our game ~hould acts more (less) hastily than in the secretary problem if the opponent's threshold is greater (smaller) than y*.
A Nash equilibrium point for this game is a set of thresholds The fact that each player's threshold in the equilibrium strategy is not identical is a remarkable feature of our mod.~l and forms a striking contrast to the strategies obtained in [2] , [3] and [4] .
Incidentally, if both companies should employ the strategy which is optimal when there is no opponent, the payoffs for both companies would be 
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Hence an equilibrium solution is as follows: one company uses the threshold 
Other Models
In this section we eonsider two variants of our basic model. Model B is different from model A in that when both companies want to employ the same applicant and she selects one of them, the other company can continue interviewing and employ anothE~r applicant. Let g(t) designate the probability that the one company succeeds in employing the best girl using the optimal strategy
given that the other company has employed the t-th applicant and left the game.
Then Ml(X,y) is given by the following:
t=x t=y
Now we consider the limiting case as n + 00, and we use the same notational convention as in section 2. After a company knows that the opponent has employed an applicant and has left the game, the optimal strategy for the remaining company is the same one as in the original secretary problem. Thus we have (3.2) and { lIe, Gilbert & Mosteller [1] , but the equilibrium points could have been obtained in a slightly different way as follows using the general theory of optimal stopping for a Markov process. As an example, we will briefly illustrate the key idea by deriving an equilibrium solution involving pure strategies only in Model A. It is well-known (see, e.g., [3] ) that the limiting version of the secretary problem is an optimal stopping problem for a Markov process with a monotone transition density function
and a continuous reward function ~(x)=x. For such a problem, the optimal stopping time is such that the expected reward from stopping at that time is e.qual to the expected reward from continuing optimally. Thus, in our particular problem, if x and y , where x < y , are the levels of the equilibrium strat- From these we obtain a set of equations which is equivalent to (2.3).
Many extensions of the present work suggest themselves. For example, one would be interested in the result for the problem with more than two employers.
It is expected, and is confirmed by a preliminary computation, that the equilibrium solution for this problem is such that all the employers use the different threshold strategies. Problems with other reward functions are also of some interest and worth investigating. These problems will be discussed in a forthcoming paper.
The author is indebted to the referees for their valuable comments; discussions in the last section, in particular, are benefitted by them.
